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The purpose of this study is to assess risks associated with the way in which U.S.
armed forces contingency operations are financed. This assessment includes: (1) An
analysis of the strategic operating environment. This analysis reveals significant post Cold
War trends that suggest past methods of financing contingency operations are no longer
appropriate. (2) A study ofhow contingency operations are currently financed and an
assessment of the risks associated with these methods. This section tracks the flow of
funds for three recent contingency operations. (3) A new approach to financing
contingency operations to mitigate the risks associated with a changing strategic
environment and more efficiently allocate resources.
The major findings are that the post Cold War strategic environment is changing in
ways that are likely to increase the frequency and scope of contingency operations.
Current methods of financing contingency operations are highly controlled, inflexible and
inadequate for meeting national security needs. Mission financing is an approach to
resourcing contingency operations that facilitates adaptation to the needs of a changing
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The close of the Cold War marks the end of nearly 50 years of defense planning
and force structure alignments intended to counter a single well defined threat. The
strategic environment has now changed. Defense planning must now deal with more
vaguely defined and unpredictable threats to national security interests. These threats
translate into contingency operations such as those recently conducted in Haiti, Somalia
and Bosnia. These events, that are increasing in frequency and scope, represent unplanned
incremental costs that current Department ofDefense (DoD) planning, programming and
budgeting systems may not be designed to handle. If current methods of financing
contingency operations are now inappropriate, then these incremental costs will inevitably
show up in a mismatch between national security requirements, and force structure
capabilities and readiness.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to serve as a risk assessment for the way in which
contingency operations are financed. This thesis analyzes the strategic environment,
reviews recent contingency operations and studies their methods of financing.
Suggestions are made on how to improve current financing methods, and a mission
financing approach is offered as a means to develop a closer match between national
security requirements and defense capabilities. After reading this chapter, the reader
should:
1) Recognize the importance of adapting methods of financing contingency
operations to meet the needs of a changing security environment.
2) Understand the incentives and potential advantages inherent in a mission
financing method of financing contingency operations.
C. SCOPE
This thesis focuses on trends of change in the strategic environment and the effects
these trends may have on future readiness and capabilities. The study also provides an
overview ofhow a mission-driven method of financing can provide incentives for more
effective allocation of defense dollars. Although readiness reporting and the creation of
appropriate accounting systems are analyzed, detailed presentations at this level fall
beyond the scope of this thesis. Other important areas of study that are beyond the scope
of this thesis include:
1
.
The status of military progress toward a common accounting
and database system.
2. The development of cost accounting and reporting standards for




How DoD financial management initiatives match with
operational initiatives such as Joint Vision 2010.
4. The role that advancing technology has on the speed and accessibility of
cost information for decision making.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions are addressed in this thesis.
Primary : Are current methods of financing contingency operations appropriate to
meet national security needs of the post Cold War strategic environment?
Secondary : How has the strategic environment changed since the end of the Cold War?
What effect has the change in the strategic environment had on the scope
and frequency of contingency operations?
How have recent contingency operations been financed?
Is there an alternative and more effective approach for financing
contingency operations to meet the needs of the new strategic
environment?
E. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I provides introductory
information, thesis purpose, research questions, scope and organization.
Chapter II provides an overview of fundamental changes taking place in the global
strategic environment. These trends include: (a) The change from a focused threat to
more vaguely defined and unpredictable threats, (b) Declining Defense budgets, (c) The
economic and political breakdown of third world nation states, (d) The changing concept
of force use.
Chapter III identifies potential problems and risks associated with current methods
of financing contingency operations. This is done by: (a) A review of three recent
contingency operations and the methods used to finance them, (b) A study of readiness
trends to document the increasing strain these operations are likely to place on future
military capabilities (using current methods of financing). This section also offers
suggestions for improving accuracy in readiness reporting.
The emphasis of Chapter IV is the introduction and advantages of a mission
financing method of matching Defense policy responsibilities with budgeting authority.
Chapter V completes the thesis with conclusions, recommendations and areas for
further research. Some of these areas include: (a) A comprehensive review of the status
of a DoD-wide common accounting system, (b) A study of capital budgeting methods
that might be applicable to Department of Defense needs, (c) The advantages of an
output-oriented readiness reporting system.
It is hoped that this study will: (1) Develop an accurate picture of current realities
in DoD resource allocation methods. (2) Provide a vision ofwhere we should be heading.
(3) Stimulate a desire to close the gap between current realities and where we need to be
in the future.
II. A CHANGED STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Chapter II focuses on assessing the emerging strategic environment. The
importance of evaluating this dynamic environment is vital since it is the first step toward
determining an applicable resource allocation policy that can meet current and future
national security requirements. There are at least four major trends in place that
significantly affect the U.S. defense strategic environment. These are:
> The Change from a Focused Threat to More Vaguely Defined and
Unpredictable Threats
> Declining Defense Budgets
> The Political and Economic Breakdown of Third World Nation States
> The Changing Concept of Force Use
The remainder of this chapter addresses these trends in more detail.
A. THE CHANGE FROM A FOCUSED THREAT
The 1996 National Security Strategy (NSS) states that the national security focus
of the last 50 years has been to contain communist expansion while deterring nuclear war.
The threat was well defined, universally agreed upon and provided a blueprint for defense
spending. This focused threat has evolved into a constantly changing and complex set of
challenges to the nation's security. These challenges include:
1. Deterring and Defeating Aggression in Major Regional Conflicts.
We must be able to counter threats to national interests in more than one
region if necessary.
2. Contributing to Multilateral Peace Operations. This includes
bolstering new democratic governments through participation in
multilateral peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
3. Supporting Counterterrorism Efforts, Fighting Drug Trafficking
and Other National Security Objectives. These missions include:
noncombatant evacuations, special forces assistance to nations and
humanitarian and disaster relief operations (NSS,1996, pp. 13).
To meet these military challenges, it is important to obtain a clear picture of the current
status of defense force structure, planning, and use of force assumptions . The remainder
of this section discusses how DoD force structures and planning assumptions have
changed from the Cold War era to present.
During the Cold War, the DoD had requested and built a force structure that was
designed to conduct a major war in Europe and fight two Major Regional Conflicts
(MRCs). These conflicts were seen as communist inspired and probably involving an
attack on South Korea and an effort to interrupt oil supplies to Japan and the West.
The major defense effort was on massing forces along Eastern European borders in
an effort to deter a Soviet onslaught. Maintaining these forces was extremely expensive.
The large military budgets of the period were justified by Pentagon claims that
approximately 50% of defense costs involved preparing for and maintaining a deterrent
against communist attack.
Following the attempted rival coup and the breakup of the USSR, it was obvious
to taxpayers, Congress and belatedly to the military leadership that Russia and the CIS no
longer represented a credible threat of a massive attack in Europe. This diminished threat
left a U.S. force structure that was seemingly obsolete and under increasing pressure to
ante up a "peace dividend". The reasoning in Congress and throughout most of the United
States went something like this: If defense budgets were built on a Cold War scenario,
which the DoD claimed accounted for about 50% of total expenditures, and that threat no
longer appeared viable, then according to the Pentagon's own estimates, a 50% defense
budget reduction could be obtained without sacrificing the ability to protect national
interests.
Colin Powell, then Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), observed these
developments and developed a strategy for the U.S. military to manage its own future. It
was obvious to Powell that ifthe military did not shape the inevitable drawdown then
Congress, and possibly future administrations, would direct DoD force structures and
budgets in ways that might not be conducive to long term national interests. Colin Powell
took charge of directing the military's future force structure and supporting budget
requirements by initiation of the Bottom-Up Review (Krieger, 1993, pp. 9). This was an
attempt to match post Cold War mission requirements with expected future mission needs.






















Source: Bottom-Up Review. 1993, pp. 3
Figure 2.1 The Bottom-Up Review Lays the Foundation for Change From a
Focused Threat
The idea was to find out what the military really needed in order to conduct its new post
Cold War roles and missions, and then rightsize forces to meet defense needs in support of
national security requirements. This review determined that a 25% cut in force structure
and DoD budgets was feasible.
Even after the Bottom-Up Review, defense planners were still reluctant to give up
what remained ofthe Cold War roles and missions. Maintaining two MRC capabilities
remained a force driver, but at the same time contingency operations that had once been
constrained by the Cold War balance ofpower, were beginning to play a bigger role in
military operations and budget requirements. As these contingency operations expanded
in scope and frequency, the DoD needed to somehow align capabilities with national
security needs. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show this shift in mission requirements and emphasis
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Figure 2.2 Cold War Planning Focus on the Right Side of Operational
Continuum
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The 1945-1989 planning focus was to buy a force structure that fit the needs of the
right side of the operational continuum. The assumption was that other "less important"
operations to the left of the continuum could be taken care of as required with the assets
and capabilities obtained from meeting the needs of the right side of the continuum. But,
as left end of continuum (contingency operations) became more frequent and important to
national security requirements, problems may emerge with previous assumptions of
building force structures for the right side of the continuum.





I HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PLANNING
FOCUS
SHIFT7^~
LEVEL OF VIOLENCE -^
Source: NPS, NS3230 Working Papers
Figure 2.3 Planning Focus Shifts to the Left
In the new strategic environment, pre- 1989 force planning logic has at least two
major flaws. (1) Those "other" operations on the left side of the continuum now represent
a greater probability of occurrence than previously anticipated. (2) The previous force
structure, methods of planning and budgeting that were built in the Cold War era are not
now well suited to meet new national security requirements. Because of this, we should
be budgetingfor and buildingforces to meet the needs ofwhere we actually operate.
(e.g., The low intensity left end of the chart as seen below.)
Current force structure and budget authority reductions actually exceed the Powell
anticipated reductions of 25 percent and a decline of 41 percent is projected by the year
2000 (1985-2000 DoD Budget Authority). These reductions and the expanding demands
of operations on the left end of the continuum (contingency type operations) now force
the DoD to hedge on their earlier assumptions of being able to fight two MRCs. This fact
and the likelihood of continued tightening budget constraints can be seen in the President's
changing statements about U.S. military capabilities in the National Security Strategies as
seen below (NSS, 1994,1995,1996). l
1994: Be able to conduct 2 MRC.
1995: Be able to conduct 2 nearly simultaneousMRC.
1996: Theforces the Administrationfields today are sufficient, in concert
with regional allies
,
to defeat aggression in two nearly simultaneous
MRCs.
What happens now to DoD force structures if it becomes clear that the United
States really does not have a requirement to conduct even two MRCs? For example,
what ifNorth and South Korea move toward unification (as did East and West Germany)
and thus eliminate one of the primary assumptions upon which the two MRC capability is
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built? Since force planners within the Pentagon have been holding the two MRC
requirement as a force and budget driver for so long, it is likely that the elimination of
realistically conducting two MRCs would also bring a renewed call for more "peace
dividends" and further force structure cuts. Calls for further cuts may not leave the United
States with the mission capabilities required to conduct the operations on the left end of
the continuum that are becoming more important and frequent.
B. DECLINING DEFENSE BUDGETS
Because Defense budgets will continue to be squeezed it is absolutely necessary to
be as efficient as possible with the dollars we are allocated. Evidence of the likelihood of
increasing constraints on Defense budgets can be shown in two ways.
1. Transfer Payment Spending Climbs as Defense Spending Declines
Since 1985, DoD outlays as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have been
steadily decreasing. Defense outlays have decreased to below four percent ofGDP as
compared to about twelve percent at the end of the Korean War, and a peak of about six
percent during the Reagan defense buildup in the Mid-80s. At the same time, entitlement
spending has continued to rise dramatically.
11
PAYMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS
Increase to 61 % by 1997
Source: Jones and Bixler, 1992, pp. 158.
Figure 2.4 Transfer Payments are Likely to Continue Climbing as
National Defense Spending Declines
As transfer spending rises and efforts to balance the budget continue, discretionary
spending, ofwhich defense is the largest portion, is likely to be asked to make up the zone
of difference.
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2. Service Budgets Project Constant Levels (At Best)
Using the Navy as an example, Figure 2.5 shows that projected budgets will at best
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Figure 2.5 Budgetary Authority Not Expected to Increase in Constant Dollars
Consequently, as the post Cold War era force structures and capabilities decline,
budgets are also likely to represent an increasing constraint. The negative effect of these
trends was pointed out by the current CJCS, General John M. Shalikashvili, in testimony
before the Armed Services Committee when he stated a $2 billion cut (less than 1%) in
defense funding could be expected to reduce defense readiness from C1-C2 to C2-C3.
The CJCS is signaling that relatively small losses (or drains) of funding are now likely to
have significant marginal effects on capabilities/
13
C. THE BREAKDOWN OF THIRD WORLD NATION STATES
In addition to preparingfor major regional contingencies and overseas
presence, we mustprepare ourforcesfor peace operations to support
democracy or conflict resolution. (NSS, 1996, pp. 22)
The above statement of U.S. policy makes it clear that ensuring stability and
supporting democracy around the world is in the nation's interest. Also implicit in this
statement is that U.S. armed forces will be used to support those interests. This section
describes how economic scarcity, overpopulation, disease and small arms transfers are
accelerating civil strife, threatening budding democracies and causing economic and
political breakdown in third world nations. This in turn increases the likelihood of future
U.S. involvement in contingency operations.
1. Small Arms Transfers Are On the Rise
Small Arms are now proliferating throughout the world at an alarming rate (CRS,
1994, pp. 3). The motive is cash and the result is increasing international instability. The
origins ofthese transfers include:
> Ex-Warsaw Pact countries in search of cash.
> Increased light weapons sales from China, Egypt and South Africa.
> Former light arms importers who are now manufacturing and exporting.
> Origins unknown (including within the United States).
Source: (Goose and Frank, 1994, pp. 87)
The negative consequences of this proliferation of small arms has already been
seen in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia. Light weapon transfers have allowed Somalian
clans to challenge U.S. troops, fanned the flames of genocide in Rwanda, and undermined
international peacekeeping efforts (land mines are a special area of concern) in Bosnia.
14
Although small arms sales and landmines are difficult to monitor and less likely to
be disclosed than major weapon sales, the Clinton Administration has shown leadership in
efforts to strengthen international laws. The U.S. State Department and the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency are developing mechanisms to control the export of landmines.
Perhaps this initiative and framework for negotiations will lead to more complete
disclosure and eventual control of the transfer of other small arms. But, until that
happens, light arms transfers will result in a more unstable international environment. The
Somalian and the Bosnian Operations are examples of U.S. involvement due in part to
instability caused by this factor. The future will undoubtedly bring even more contingency
operations because of the rise in small arms transfers. These operations could be costly
both in terms of casualties and higher defense costs.
2. Disease and Manmade Environmental Disasters
Disease, environmental depletion, and civil war are already creating large scale
border upheaval throughout Africa. Refugee migrations are causing borders in many
countries to become largely meaningless. For example, 400,000 Sierra Leonians are
internally displaced, 280,000 more have fled to Guinea, 100,000 have gone to Liberia, at
the same time that 400,000 Liberians have gone to Sierra Leone. Rwanda, Uganda and
Zaire have refugee flows to an even greater degree. This displacement of people stresses
already weak sanitary conditions, spreads disease and creates huge humanitarian assistance
questions for Africa, the United Nations (UN) and in many cases the United States.
Recent examples of U.S. forces involvement due to these factors include formation of a
Joint Task Force (JTF) to alleviate suffering in Rwanda and recent Noncombatant
Evacuation Operations (NEO) for Zaire.
While the factors of disease, environmental depletion and economic scarcity are
already contributing to instability throughout the African continent, this same scenario is
also unfolding in other regions. This situation is fertile ground for the emergence of both
15
autocratic governments and threats to U.S. national interests. As an increasingly large
number of people lose any hope of economic prosperity, many will chose to follow non-
democratic leaders who promise to find and attack the cause of problems. These regimes,
as Hitler and Saddam Hussein did, might garner power by pointing to an outside "enemy"
or to unsympathetic factions within the region as a way to solidify power and control.
So, as scarce resources and dwindling economic fortunes place a greater strain on
many peoples around the world, the Saddam Husseins of the future will have more
opportunities to threaten U.S. interests (Kaplan, 1994, pp. 12). This point is not
overlooked by the 1996 NSS when it states:
1996 National Security Strategy
One cannot help but conclude that population growth and environmental
pressures willfeed into immense social unrest andpresent a very real risk
to regional stability around the world. ( NSS, 1996, pp. 26)
3. The Rise in UN Operations and the Role of U.S. Leadership
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a new era ofUN peacekeeping.
In the past, the super-power balance held these operations in check. "Interference" could
turn to escalation, and direct confrontation was to be avoided. But, in recent years, as
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Source: Segal and Eyre, 1994, Figure 1.
Figure 2.6 UN Efforts to Mitigate Suffering are on the Rise
In cases where the scope and requirements of a crisis outstrip UN capabilities, the
assistance of U.S. forces is likely to be requested. Figure 2.7 shows the recent increasing
U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
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Source: Segal and Eyre, 1994, Figure 2.
Figure 2.7 U.S. Efforts in Humanitarian Operations
Increase as the UN Is Overwhelmed
In summary, U.S. participation in peace and humanitarian operations (contingency
type operations) is likely to become an increasingly important part of U.S. foreign policy.
Escalating instability, societal breakdown and spreading violence in many Third World
nations are likely to place increasing demands on the United Nations. Certain crises will
exceed UN capabilities. In these situations, where national interests are perceived at
stake, U.S. armed forces are likely to participate. Defining those interests, and
determining when and how U.S. forces will be committed is discussed in the next section.
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Ifnot in the interests of the state, do not act. Ifyou cannot
succeed, do not use troops... the enlightened ruler isprudent and the good
general is warned against rash action. Thus the state is kept secure and
n
the army preserved. SUN TZU
D. THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF FORCE USE
The purpose of this section is to describe the changing criteria for determining
when and how U.S. forces are to be employed in contingency operations. This will be
presented as follows. The concept of force use as articulated in the Weinberger Doctrine
will provide a starting point from which the recently changing views on force use as
described in the 1996 NSS will be discussed. This changing concept of force use adds to
an environment where there is a greater possibility of utilizing U.S. armed forces to carry
out a broader array of national security objectives.
1. Concept of Force Use Articulated in the Weinberger Doctrine
Today's concepts ofwhen and how to employ U.S. forces, are largely based on the
ideas of then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger's 1984 speech entitled "The Uses of
Military Power." This speech outlined six major tests to be applied by policy makers
prior to committing U.S. forces abroad. Weinberger's criteria are shown below:
Concepts of the Weinberger Doctrine
1
.
Do not commit forces to combat unless vital interests are at stake.
2. Always employ troops in sufficient numbers and support to enable them to win.
19
3. Clearly define political and military objectives.
4. Closely monitor the relationship between objectives and the size or composition
of American forces.
5. Determine if reasonable assurance of support from the American people exists.
6. Commit forces only as a last resort.
Source: Jordon, Taylor, Korb, 1986, pp. 302
The Weinberger Doctrine can be summarized with the following statement: "Be
very cautious about committing U.S. forces to combat, but when you do commit them, do
so overwhelmingly" (Owens, 1995, pp. 29). This doctrine was rooted in three factors.
The first factor was the strong distaste ofthe American people and the military for either
involvement in another Vietnam type conflict or in a repeat of the bombing of the Marine
barracks in Beirut (Powell, 1995, pp. 302-303). The second factor was that in the bipolar
Cold War era, events overseas were likely to be seen (rightly or not) in the context of
Soviet expansionism and could thus be clearly defined as negatively affecting our national
interests. The third factor influencing Weinberger's call for a restrictive use of force was
that any intervention by the U.S. during this period brought implications of global
escalation and the possibility of nuclear war (Owens, 1995, pp. 28).
2. Changing Views of Force Use
While those who currently decide when and where to commit U.S. forces may feel
less constrained by the factors that shaped the Weinberger Doctrine, their decisions are as
complex and difficult as ever. On the one hand, committing forces to a regional
contingency is unlikely to result in either an escalation outside the area of interest or in a
nuclear threat of Cold War proportions. On the other hand, events unfolding overseas
(no longer as clearly delineated in a bi-polar world) are now much more difficult to define
as vital to U.S. interests. As a result, a doctrinal shift is occurring. Some say there is
20
evidence that the assumptions of force use in the Weinberger Doctrine may deserve a
closer look, and that the U.S. armed forces can and should be used in a broader array of
deterrent, peacekeeping and humanitarian roles. Evidence of this can be seen below in
Admiral William A. Owens' assumptions about force use.
Admiral Owens' Pragmatic Concept of Force TJse
> The United States can use its militaryforces effectively, without risking
heavy casualties.
> Credible, proportional use offorce, when required, is an important
element in demonstrating U.S. will to be an effective deterrent and
coalition partner and is therefore, in the long-term national interest.
Source: Owens, 1995, pp. 29
The 1996 National Security Strategy (NSS) combines these concepts on force use
and outlines three basic categories of situations that would call for the use of armed
forces. These three categories are: (a) Vital U.S. interests are affected, (b) Important but
not vital U.S. interests affected, and (c) Humanitarian operations when its "the right thing
to do." The next sub-sections cover these categories and recaps how the changing
concept of force use is likely to create more opportunities for contingency operations.
a. Category ofForce Use #1: Vital U.S. Interests are Affected
Vital interests are defined as threats to national survival, security or of
economic importance. The President states; "We will do whatever it takes to defend these
interests." (NSS, 1996, pp. 18) The use of "decisive" military forces is directed in these
situations. An example of this category is the use of force in reaction to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait when U.S. and worldwide oil sources were threatened.
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b. Category ofForce Use #2: Important But Not Vital U.S.
Interests Affected
These situations do not affect national survival but do have the potential to
affect national well-being. The contingency operation in Haiti is an examples in this
category. Haiti represented a combination of situations including a budding democracy
that needed help and a humanitarian assistance needs that the U.S. leadership felt
represented important national interests. In these types of cases U.S. forces would be
used only if the following criteria are met:
> Military forces could advance our interests.
> It is likely that armed forces could achieve their objectives.
> The costs and risks of using armed forces have been weighed against the
value of those objectives. Costs refer to the nation's treasure including
human, material and financial. Being able to define, accurately track and
access the costs of these operations is a prerequisite for an adequate
cost/benefit analysis.
> Other means (such as diplomatic and economic) have been tried and
failed to achieve objectives.
c Category ofForce Use #3: When its "The Right Thing to Do"
"We cannot save all women and all children. But we can save many of
them. We can't do everything, but we must do what we can.
"
President Clinton
Source: The New York Times, November 28, 1995. Clinton's words on Mission to Bosnia.
In this speech and in the NSS, the President established as policy that the
U.S. military's unique transportation, medical, communication, and supply capabilities may
be called upon to respond to human suffering or catastrophe relief missions. In these
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cases, although vital national interests (other than moral interests) are not affected, the
U.S. military may represent the only organization capable of dealing with a situation that
would overwhelm virtually any other nation or organization The relief mission in Rwanda
is an example in this category. The threat to the U.S. and its forces was minimal, the
military performed essential lifesaving roles, and turned the operation over to international
relief agencies.
d Contingencies And The Changing Concept ofForce Use
The larger issue is not whether the Weinberger Doctrine or other recent
doctrinal statements on force use are correct, but that the concept of force use is changing
and the newer doctrinal adaptations are fertile ground for increasing the frequency and
scope of contingency operations.
E. SUMMARY
In summary, the changing strategic environment is having a profound effect on the
Pentagon's way of doing business. Building a force structure based on past threat
assumptions is no longer justifiable. Declining defense budgets are forcing a search for the
most efficient use of dollars, and contingency operations are on the rise for at least four
reasons.
> Cold War era constraints no longer apply.
> As events occur that outstrip the capabilities of every other organization
or government, the U.S. is increasingly turned to for leadership .
> The political and economic breakdown of third world nation states
threatens U.S. national interests.
> The changing concept of force use makes it easier for U.S. troops to be
committed abroad.
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These factors not only add up to increasing contingency requirements but also to
increasing costs associated with these unplanned and unbudgeted operations. Chapter III
discusses these increasing costs and how they are currently financed. Also discussed are
the short and long term implications of continuing to use these financing methods in light
of the trends just discussed.
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ENDNOTES
Changes from the previous year's NSS are emphasized by underlining.
2 Note that the FY 1998/1999 Department of the Navy Budget projects rising Total
Obligational Authority in the Budget's outyears. This assumption is probably optimistic at
best.
I
C1-C2: Units can undertake from the full to the bulk ofwartime missions.
C2-C3: Units can undertake from the bulk to major portions of wartime missions. Units
expected to be operationally ready strive to maintain at least a C-2 status. (GAO/NSIAD-
96-1 1 1BR Military Readiness)
Two years after the CJCS made these statements, the OMB asked the Pentagon to
"find" $2 Billion to cover the costs of contingency operations in Bosnia. Bosnia and
Readiness will be covered in more depth later in the study.
"In one incident in 1993, 150 tons of assault rifles, mortars, rocket launchers, land
mines, and ammunition, mostly of Chinese and Chech manufacture, were found in a
warehouse in Slovenia, intended for Bosnian Muslims." (Goose and Smyth, 1994, pp. 93)
In Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, and Ghana most of the primary rain forest is being
destroyed at an alarming rate. In Sierra Leone, in 1961 as much as 60% of the country
was primary rain forest, now only 6% is rain forest. In the Ivory Coast the proportion has
fallen from 38% to eight percent. Virtually everyone in the West African interior has
malaria. HTV is pervasive with over 8 million in Africa carrying the disease. (Kaplan,
1994, pp 27)
n
SUN TZU makes it clear that war is to be used only as a last resort.
o
° Add to this the growing ability of U.S. forces to use precision guided weapons that
allow the military to become a foreign policy tool while standing out of harms way.
See Chapter III for a more in-depth discussion on this topic.
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III. HOW DOES THE DoD PAY FOR CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONS?
The purpose of Chapter III is to determine if the methods used presently to finance
contingency operations are appropriate for the changing strategic environment. This
chapter has four sections. The first section discusses the source and standard budgeting
processes that might be used to finance a generic contingency operation. The second
section reviews three recent contingency operations and their financing sources in more
detail. The third section looks at the effect that post Cold War contingency operations are
having on readiness trends. This section introduces evidence that one method of financing
contingency operations might be through a sacrifice of future military readiness and
capabilities. The fourth section summarizes the findings of this chapter and also offers
suggestions for obtaining greater accuracy in readiness reporting and improving current
methods of financing contingency operations. Chapter III concludes with an emphasis of
the need to adapt current methods of financing contingency operations to fit the
requirements of the new strategic environment.
A. FINANCING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
This section discusses the source and standard budgeting processes that might be
used to finance a generic contingency operation. Contingency operations are currently
financed from two sources:
1
.
Already appropriated funds including holdbacks, reprogramming
and transfers.
2. Supplemental funds appropriated by Congress.
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1. Already Appropriated Funds
To understand the impact of using already appropriated funds for financing
contingency operations, it is appropriate to first briefly explain how the DoD:
> Determines what resources are needed to meet national security needs.
> Makes funding requests.
> Executes the funds appropriated to it by Congress.
A highly structured and formalized system, the Planning Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS), was first implemented in 1962 to meet Cold War defense needs. After
explaining this process of requesting, authorizing and apportioning funds, the techniques
employed to use these funds for contingency operations are discussed.
a. The PPBS Systemfor Obtaining Funds
The DoD Budget Process can be broken down into the formulation and
execution phases. The Formulation Phase involves: (1) Preparation of Estimates, (2)
Negotiation as spending requests transit the Executive and Legislative Branches, and (3)
Enactment of spending measures. After Enactment, the Execution Phase of the Budget
process commences. The Execution Phase involves: (1) Spending, (2) Monitoring and
Control, and (3) Audit and Evaluation of the way in which obligated funds have been













































Source: NPS, NS 3230 Working Papers
Figure 3.1 The PPBS Process For Defense Resource Allocation
Preparation of Estimates. The DoD Budget Cycle starts with the
National Security Strategy (NSS). This document establishes national security policy
priorities ofthe President. A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment of the threat
is then combined with NSS priorities to build the National Military Strategy (NMS). This
document describes how the Armed Forces intend to meet the assessed threat and carry
out the priorities described in the President's NSS. The National Military Strategy
(NMS) is then used to by the Office of the Secretary ofDefense (OSD) in preparing the
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG indicates the assets, forces, and resources
needed to carry out U.S. security needs.
It is upon this base that the OSD establishes priorities and guidelines for
submission of budget estimates by the services. For the Navy, the DoD Comptroller
provides guidance to the Comptroller of the Navy, who in turn provides guidance to the
Fleet Comptrollers. Aggregated budget estimates then progress back up the chain of
command until the Navy's budget estimate is eventually combined with the other services
for SECDEF review and approval. These estimates, of which the Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM) is a portion, are scrubbed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the
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OSD, and eventually become the OSD's Budget Estimate Submission (BES). This
document is brought before joint OSD/OMB budget hearings, and after more scrubbing
becomes the President's Defense Budget. The Defense Budget is then combined with
other Executive Departments' budgets and is presented to Congress. As can be seen by
the above process, the players who are able to justify and support their budgets at the
fleet, Service, DoD and OMB levels are then in a position to present their requests to the
Legislative Branch. But, there is no guarantee that the Legislative Branch will agree with







Source: NPS, NS 3230 Working Papers
Figure 3.2 Congressional Budget Process
After formulation and submission of the President's Budget, Congress
starts a process that often provides less funds than the President wants for particular
programs. The first step is adoption of a framework for the next year's budget. This is
called the Budget Resolution. The Resolution contains spending and revenue targets, and
serves as a guide for specific programs considered during passage of authorizations and
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appropriations laws. Authorizations and appropriations can be very specific as to the
amount and way in which funds are spent. To support these specifics, the Services may be
called upon at any time during the congressional budget process to explain or justify
requested funding. The House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees for Defense
then recommend spending levels to the full committees.
The next step is enactment of the budget. The full committees scrub the
budget further and submit the budget measure to the floor of the House and the Senate for
a vote. Again, anywhere throughout this process, spending for individual programs can be
modified up, down or even completely deleted. When spending and revenue measures are
passed by Congress, they are sent to the President for signature. He can either sign, veto,
or sit on the measure until it effectively is vetoed. Assuming the measure is signed, the
next phase is Execution of the Budget.
At this point, money has been authorized and appropriated by Congress for
Defense Department spending requirements. A problem for the DoD is that the format
and language that the DoD submitted as part of the President's Budget is not the same as
the authorization and appropriation format and language. Therefore, it is up to the OMB
to decipher this spending language and translate it into a format that both meets DoD
needs and certifies to the Treasury that the funds are being used as intended by Congress.
This process determines the funds that are available for DoD programs and apportions
these funds by fiscal year (FY) and quarter.
After apportionment, the Defense Department is finally able to spend.
Spending is done according to a set of targets referred to as "control numbers," and must
abide with established rules and processes.
Budget execution continues with monitoring and control. Monitoring
assesses what is being spent in relation to planned spending. The accountants and
budgeters have a set of criteria used to uncover variances between planned and actual
spending. These criteria include tracking spending by amount, timing or schedule, volume
and workload.
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A Mid-Year Review is conducted to evaluate the level of spending and
resource requirements to meet objectives for the remainder of the year. At this review,
money is often reallocated from one program to another to compensate for variations
between planned and actual spending as discussed above. A central purpose of monitoring
and control is to remain within both the guidelines of the Antideficiency Act and the
restrictions placed on reprogramming of funds by Congress.
Audits are also part of budget execution. Like taxes and death there is one
thing in the budget process that is certain. That certainty is a visit from the OMB, the
GAO or a host of other agencies eager to sniff out improper outlays or misuse of
government funds. These audits generally come in at least three forms:
> Financial Audits which reconcile outlays with appropriations.
> Management Audits which evaluate efficiency and effectiveness of
spending.
> Program Evaluations which evaluate the need for programs
(Also known as Policy Analysis).
The PPBS system may be summarized as follows. Based on the anticipated
threat, a strategy is developed. Requirements of that strategy are then estimated and
programs are developed to execute the strategy. Finally, the costs of executing approved
programs are budgeted. Figure 3.3 shows this sequence
32
Is This Cold War Era Process Capable of Adapting to the Needs of the New
Strategic Environment?
THREAT-> STRATEGY-> REQUEREMENTS~> PROGRAMS-> BUDGET
Source: Practical Comptrollership, 1996, pp. C-2.
Figure 3.3 The PPBS Sequence for Formulation and Execution of Defense
Funding
There is also an informal process involved in the development of national
security requirements and the formulation and execution defense budgets. While the
formal process described above sets up the rules ofthe resource allocation game, the
informal process involves strategies on how to effectively play within the rules. Below are
several issues pertaining to this informal process.
> While Congress is certainly concerned with national security, of great
concern to these elected representatives is DoD funding repercussions on
home district jobs, contract spending and status of base alignment plans.
> Typically, members of Congress are predisposed to defense spending
needs along a spectrum that ranges from nearly always supportive to nearly
always non-supportive. There are some members who traditionally vote to
support defense requests At the other end of the spectrum are those who
almost certainly will vote against. In the middle are those who are swayed
according to the specific argument and the political savvy of the players.
> Much of what happens in the Legislative Branch is developed by
Congressional staffers and takes place behind closed doors at the
Subcommittee level. Because of this, it is important to keep informed of
possible rumblings which could cause a threat to defense programs.
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> READINESS is the buzzword. Appropriations are dependent on the
Services' ability to justify readiness needs.
> The President's Budget must be supported by the Services. But, if
subcommittee members wish to place a higher priority on certain programs,
those testifying are obligated to be prepared and answer questions
truthfully. Obviously this is a fine line to walk. But again, defense
department representatives need to be prepared to answer questions about
the things that interest members of the Subcommittee such as jobs, base
alignments, readiness and contracts.
The Bottom Line
> The budget process is a huge competition for scarce taxpayers dollars.
> The players who know and can apply the formal and the informal rules
are in the best position to compete effectively for scarce budgeted dollars.
> The PPBS System may be appropriate for the defense requirements of
the Cold War era, (e.g., right side of the operational continuum) but what
happens when unplanned and unbudgeted contingency operations disrupt
this highly formalized and structured process?
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b. Retention ofFunds at Each Level
Since DoD budget holders at all levels realize that the likelihood of a
"budget busting" contingency operation is high, it is becoming increasingly common to
holdback apportioned funds in anticipation of releasing these funds as inevitable needs
arise. Figure 3.4 shows the key players in the budget execution chain ofcommand who


















Figure 3.4 Holdbacks Are Common At All Levels
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The benefit of this practice is to build in some flexibility for funding
contingency operations. The cost is the unavailability of those funds for their intended
purposes until the chances of needing them for an unplanned event have diminished.
When these funds (referred to as year-end "sweep up" money) are released late in the
fiscal year, the result is a rush to spend before the appropriation expires. As shown below,
the year end spending spree is seen by Congress as inefficient and unintended use of tax
dollars.
Congressional Testimony on Federal Agency's
"Use It or Lose It" Policy
The subcommittee's probe has revealed that funds appropriated for
specific programs are not being rationally obligated to achieve
Congressionally intended objectives. Rather, much of thefunds are being
pushed out thefinal weeks of thefiscalyear on questionable contracts and
other spending. GAO investigations are documenting the fact the funds
are being diverted from the purpose laid out by Congress, causing
millions, perhaps billions, ofdollars to be wasted on unnecessary projects
andpurchases during the last two months of thefiscalyear.
Source: Congressional Subcommittee on Human Resources testimony to offer an amendment to HR-7590.
As shown from the Congressional Records transcript, the practice of rapidly
spending "sweep-up" money at the end of the fiscal year has become a point of contention,
and does little to build a relationship of trust and confidence between Congress and the
Pentagon.
c Use ofFuture Quarter Apportionments
An unanticipated contingency operation usually first affects the current
quarter apportionments for the O&M accounts of the units or budget holders involved in
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the operation. Once these funds are depleted, the funds apportioned for following
quarters are generally used.
d Reprograms and Transfers
As funds become depleted for units conducting operations, the Fund
Administrating Activity (or higher) will issue a request to other units not directly involved
in the operation to "scrub their budgets for excess funds." These current and future
quarter funds from other units are then used in hopes of later being replenished by
reprograms or supplemental requests. Reprogramming provides the flexibility to revise
programs within an appropriation. The DoD sets thresholds based on cumulative
increases and must then turn to transfers when these thresholds are reached. Transfer
Authority is the authority to transfer funds between appropriations. The thresholds for
making these transfers are established by the congressionally passed DoD appropriation
and authorization acts and require approval by the Office ofManagement and Budget.
There are restraints on reprograms and transfers. Both reprograms and
transfers may require congressional approval ifthe funding involves a congressional
interest item or if they exceed legislated limits.
e Antideficiency Act Violation
One final note on the funding of a generic contingency operation. With all
of this moving of funds, use of holdbacks, drawing from future period appropriations,
reprograms and transfers, the objective in the minds of budget holders is avoiding a 1517
(Antideficiency Act) violation. An Antideficiency Act violation occurs when funds are
obligated or expended in excess of amounts authorized. Discussions with comptrollers at
several levels of the Defense Department financial chain of command indicate that this is
an area of prime concern.
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Consequently, as an unexpected contingency operation depletes funds from
appropriated accounts, the incentives and mechanisms in place require budget holders to
find funds to pay for quickly depleting accounts while at the same time avoid a 15 17
violation. Finally, budget holders look to supplemental funding to conduct the activities
that were originally budgeted for but cannot now be done.
2. Supplemental Funds
The use of supplemental funds appropriated by Congress is the second method to
pay for the contingency operations. Obtaining additional funds from Congress means
being able to document and justify that already appropriated funds are insufficient to meet
national defense needs. It also means having access to accurate and timely accounting,
readiness and resource information. By being able to provide this information, the
Services can build a relationship of trust and common purpose with the legislative branch.
If information is suspect, congressional flinders have a greater tendency to micromanage
the way already appropriated funds are used and to question requests for supplemental
funding. What kind ofjob has the DoD done recently in providing this information to
Congress? The next section reviews three recent contingency operations and answers this
question.
B. A REVIEW OF THREE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
Thus far the thesis has analyzed general methods and examples ofhow contingency
operations are funded. Now, three specific contingency operations will be discussed.
These operations are:
> Operation Restore Hope in Somalia
> Operation Sea Angel, the Bangladesh Disaster Relief Mission
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> The Bosnian Peacekeeping Mission
This section discusses how these operations were financed and reviews some of the
problems that could be associated with continued use of these methods for future
operations.
1. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia
This section describes the original intent and changing nature of the operation and
a breakdown of costs and how they were paid.
a. The Changing Nature of Operation Restore Hope
Originally involving relief for famine-stricken Somalia, Restore Hope
provides a classic example of mission creep. Budgeting for contingency operations not
only means utilizing proper methods of financing but also using proper policy decisions on
the use of armed forces.
True to the form ofmany contingency operations, the first forces
responding to a situation vital to U.S. interests are forward deployed. In the case of
Operation Restore Hope, the initial force was the 1 5th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
deployed on the amphibious assault ships USS Tripoli, USS Juneau and USS Rushmore.
These enabling forces secured the seaport and airport ofMogadishu so that
reinforcements of additional Marine and Army units could surge forward from bases
within the United States.
The initial mission involved two objectives. The first objective was to
provide security for relief supplies entering the country. The second objective was to
protect food convoys moving within the country. Both of these objectives were
successfully met. Within days, international relief supplies were arriving unhindered
through Mogadishu's ports, and convoys were able to reach destinations. The effect of
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U.S. forces was both immediate and positive. The mass starvation of the Somalian people
was halted.
The scope of the mission then changed. No exit strategy had been
developed before commitment of U.S. forces and an important question began to assume
greater proportions. How could U.S. forces leave without a reoccurrence of the situation
that brought them there? It was assumed that as soon as support was withdrawn that civil
disorder and man-made, corruption caused famine would inevitably follow. So, after U.S.
forces were in country, the mission changed. The new mission involved nation building
and peace making through the elimination of sources of civil disorder. The result was
disaster. U.S. forces had been committed to a mission for which it was neither trained, nor
had specific measures for accomplishment.
Proper utilization of available doctrine on force use could avoid future
problems of this type. Components of this doctrine include not committing forces to
combat unless vital interests are at stake; always employing troops in sufficient numbers
and support to enable them to win; and clearly defining political and military objectives. If
available doctrine is used correctly, U.S. military capabilities and readiness will be more
suited to meeting national security requirements, if not a mismatch is possible that could
cost more than mere appropriated funds.
b. Breakdown of Costs and How They Were Paid
The cost for the first six months of Operation Restore Hope was $101
million more than was available in the entire FMFPAC FY-93 O&M budget. (Flynn, 1994,
pp. 53) This amount was obviously more than the units participating in this contingency
could absorb, so a variety of techniques already discussed were used to finance this
operation. These techniques included.
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> Using O&M funds apportioned for future quarters. By the end of
the first quarter ofFY 93, FMFPAC (The major claimant for Marine units
involved in Restore Hope.) was already dipping into funds allocated for the
third quarter ofFY 93. By the beginning ofMarch 1993, (with over six
months remaining in the FY) FMFPAC had expended 100% of its FY-93
O&M budget. 3
> Return of "excess" funds. A message from FMFPAC was sent to
Marine units throughout the Pacific. This message requested that units not
directly involved in Operation Restore Hope to scrub their budgets and
return "non mission essential" funds.
> A request for supplemental funds. The Marine Corps and the other
Services submitted requests for supplemental funding to pay the additional
costs of participating in Operation Restore Hope. Before this request went
to Congress, the Office ofManagement and Budget requested that the
DoD try to find sources within already appropriated defense funds to help
defray the total request for new appropriations. Of the $1 .2 Billion
supplemental request, the plan submitted involved over $762 million in
reprograms from already appropriated DoD funds. (Clymer, 1993, A 13:3)
Many in Congress believed that the DoD could not afford to absorb
operations of this size without reducing future readiness or capabilities below prudent
levels. Because of these concerns, the House of Representatives, in coordination with the
Senate Appropriations Committee, crafted a supplemental funding bill that would not
require the DoD to take the funds "out of hide." As stated by Representative John P.
Murtha, (D-PA) of the House Appropriations Committee:
They wereforced to do it (request the money through reprogramming) by
the OMB. They (DoD) can't afford it, and they know they can't afford it.
The Somalia reliefoperation had not been expected and reprogramming
thosefunds would have taken the costs out of the hide of the Department
ofDefense (Clymer, 1993, A 13:3).
But, before the Senate version of this supplemental bill was voted on, the
New York Times ran a story that blasted the House of Representatives for trying to spend
funds that were not even requested by the DoD. The story stated that the DoD had
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submitted a request that involved reprogramming funds from "lower priority" programs
and that members of the House of Representatives was merely trying to deliver more pork
to their home district (Clymer, 1993, A 13:3). This Times article must have caused much
hand wringing in Congress because when the supplemental bill came before the Senate, it
was rejected by a vote of 95-0. A House/Senate Conference Committee crafted a new bill
that called for $973 million in reprogramming. This bill did pass and was signed into law
by President Clinton in July 1993.
What was the impact ofusing these methods of financing Operation
Restore Hope? After going through a rigorous planning and programming process that
required justification and prioritization of planned expenditures to meet current and future
mission capabilities and readiness, the services were again hit with an unplanned for
operation that resulted in a drain on already appropriated accounts. The result was an
immediate and significant reduction ofO&M funds for non-deployed activities throughout
the Pacific. Directly affected was current combat readiness and capabilities. Major
equipment maintenance and overhaul schedules were stretched out. Combat training was
delayed or halted completely and plans for reconstituting (following Desert Shield/Desert
Storm) Maritime Preposition Forces (MPF) were slid into future years' budgets.
Training exercises were cut back and ammunition use (essential for effective combat
training) was restricted. For example: Marine Force, US Pacific Fleet (FMFPAC), the
command which contributed the majority ofMarines for the operation, experienced a $7.8
million shortfall for the support of normal pre-deployment training of its units (Flynn,
1994, pp. 63).
Other accounts affected by contingency related reprograms involved
building maintenance, public works, utilities, road repair, child care, and many other
"quality of life" activities (Flynn, 1994, pp. 53). Consistent shortfalls in these accounts
undoubtedly have an effect on long term readiness and capabilities.
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2. Operation Sea Angel (Bangladesh)
This section covers Operation Sea Angel, and a breakdown of costs and how they
were financed.
a. Operation Sea Angel
Operation Sea Angel (1 1-29 May, 1991) was an event of relatively short
duration. The purpose of this mission was to provide disaster relief to a cyclone
devastated region. The storm, with sustained winds of over 145 MPH and 20 foot tidal
waves crashed into coastal Bangladesh. The disaster left over 1 50,000 people dead and
over a million homeless. Without prompt action there was a real possibility for thousands
of more deaths from disease and lack of clean water. Local government and international
relief agencies were overwhelmed, and no other entity except for the U.S. military had the
capabilities to respond quickly and effectively.
The U.S. did respond with the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF).
Assigned to the JTF were primarily units on the way home after serving more than five
months in the Persian Gulf. In an effort to reduce the risk of further deaths due to disease
and starvation, the mission of the JTF was distribution offood, water, and medical
supplies.
The operation involved assets that are normally assigned to a forward
deployed Marine Expeditionary Brigade. These resources included helicopters, air
cushion landing craft, small boats and a self sufficient base (USS Tarawa). U.S. forces
also possessed an appropriate mix of medical teams, engineers and water purifying
equipment.
The JTF conducted over 2,000 air lifts to the stricken area. More than
5,000 tons of supplies were delivered by air and boat. Also, over a 250,000 gallons of
fresh water was provided and at least 7,000 people were given medical attention
(Stackpole, 1992). It is likely that no other organization in the world would have been
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able to respond to this humanitarian disaster as quickly as the U.S. military. It is also
likely that these types of disasters will happen again, and that the U.S. will continue to
assume a leadership role in disaster relief operations.
b. Breakdown of Costs andHow They Were Paid
Like most contingency operations, Operation Sea Angel was initially
funded out of current and future quarter O&M accounts. The costs recorded by the
Services involved mostly direct costs such as consumable supplies, fuel for airlifts and
additional personnel costs (per diem). These costs were expended in the third quarter of
FY-91 and a request was submitted halfway through the fourth quarter for
reimbursement.
A full year after completion of the operation, reimbursement had still not
been made. A Headquarters Marine Corps memo ofJune 1, 1992 stated that USMC cost
of operations in support of Sea Angel had been absorbed by O&M accounts, and if
reimbursement was not forthcoming, Marine Corps' training and supply accounts would
foot the bill. This unplanned for and unreimbursed operation was eventually paid for
from "lower priority" accounts.
Operation Sea Angel, relatively small in nature but requiring the unique
assets and capabilities that only U.S. armed forces are capable of providing, represents the
type of mission that promises to increase in frequency. Under current financing methods
this could be a significant challenge, since the small size ofthese types of operations means
there is almost no chance of receiving supplemental appropriations. Appendix C provides
a recap of recent smaller (unplanned for and thus unbudgeted) contingency operations
undertaken to protect national interests. The list includes more than 90 contingency
operations conducted within the last four years. Each of these operations involves
additional cost burdens that are in some way financed by borrowing from either current or
future readiness and capabilities.
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3. Bosnian Peacekeeping Operations
The Dayton Peace Accords translated into the deployment to Bosnia of
almost 27,000 U.S. forces. The DoD originally estimated additional costs of supporting
Bosnian operations at approximately $2 Billion/year (GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR Bosnia)
This subsection discusses the reliability ofDoD cost estimates and covers Defense plans to
finance this significant but unplanned for operation. Emphasis is placed on the three
financing methods outlined below:
> Shifting Funds Forward From Future Quarters
> Reprogramming Requests
> A Supplemental Appropriations Request
a. Shifting Funds From Future Quarters
As discussed, using funds apportioned for later in the fiscal year is a
common first step in contingency financing. The problem associated with this method is
that if funds are not quickly obtained to replenish these operating accounts, then
discretionary OPTEMPO funds are depleted before the end of the fiscal year. When this
happens training and other activities, including flight events in squadrons or days at sea for
ships, must be curtailed or suspended. Reductions in previously budgeted activities mean
one of two things: (1) Readiness and/or military capabilities suffer either now or in the
long run, (2) The budgeted activities, considered high enough priority to receive funding
from the highly structured and scrutinized PPBS System, were really not important
enough to impact readiness or military capabilities. The former is more likely
In April 1996, the Army estimated that failure to find additional funds to
replace those funds brought forward from future quarters to pay for Bosnian Operations
Q
would cause a curtailment of training throughout the Service. Units required to take this
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action would obviously be impaired in their ability to respond to national security
requirements. Neither the Services nor Congress wanted this. So, reprogramming was
used to fill the funding gaps created by the shifting of appropriated funds from future
quarters.
b. Reprogramming ofFunds
To replenish those operating accounts, the DoD normally submits an
annual request to move funds from one account to another of previously appropriated
funds. Basically, this is a request for relieffrom some of the spending guidelines imposed
by Congress so that "higher priority" needs can be funded. This request takes the form of
an Omnibus Reprogramming Request.
The 1996 Omnibus Reprogramming Request made specific requests to
reallocate appropriated funds to offset "unanticipated" increased costs ofBosnian
operations. Upon closer review of this 1996 Omnibus Reprogramming Request,
several observations might be drawn:
1. The purpose of the reprogramming request is not to provide funding for
the achievement of pre-contingency funding priorities, but to set the
defense financial house in order, and avoid 1517 violations, before the end
of the fiscal year. The Omnibus Reprogramming Request is made in late
July. This is the standard time frame for such requests. This means that
even if approved by Congress in early August, the drained training,
maintenance and operations accounts will have precious little time before
appropriations expire to make up for lost opportunities.
2. Congress has made much ado about the DoD obligating large chunks of
appropriated funds in the months prior to expiration, yet approval of the
reprogramming request in August or September virtually assures either that
this will happen or that reprogrammed money will expire unused.
3. The general format of the individual reprogramming requests is to
replenish already expended annual appropriations (O&M, MILPERS) by
shifting funds from multiyear accounts (Procurement, Construction). The
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effect on these multiyear accounts is to stretch out acquisition timetables,
reduce order quantities in a given year and increase cost per unit.
4. Some of the reprogramming requests seem to be an effort to cover the
cost of carrying out actions which were mandated by Congress. These
additional mandates often came without additional funding to make them
happen. At first this did not seem to apply directly to contingency
operations, but funds initially budgeted for an operational unit which is
1
2
"taxed" to pay for congressionally required initiatives, certainly puts an
additional constraint on that unit's ability to perform assigned missions.
5. The reprogramming request sweeps across all Services. Even those
Services not significantly involved in Bosnian Operations were asked to
help cover the cost of operations. This means that the Services who are
better able to track and document all costs associated with a contingency
operation are more likely to be reimbursed by the reprogramming. On the
other hand, those Services unable to justify costs are likely to be asked to
have their multiyear programs stretched out to pay for sister Services'
incremental contingency operation costs.
c Supplemental Funding Request
The GAO released a study in March 1996 that reviewed the DoD FY 1995
request for supplemental funds in support ofBosnian Operations. This report also made
recommendations on how Congress should handle DoD supplemental funding requests not
only for Bosnia but also for contingency operations in general. The results of this report
reveal some interesting points which, if a Service takes action on, could significantly
enhance ability to secure reimbursement for the costs of future contingency operations.
The GAO study looked at how the Services used the 1995 (previous year)
supplemental funding provided by Congress. Some of the Services ended fiscal year 1995
with contingency costs in excess of their share of supplemental funding. These Services
had to absorb those additional costs by reducing other planned activities (e.g., reductions
in planned maintenance, training, steaming or flying). Other Services ended the fiscal year
with contingency costs less than the amount of supplemental funding they received. These
services used these "excess funds" to pay for previously unfunded requirements.
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The GAO knows that Congress does not look kindly on the Services using
funds for purposes other than appropriated. While the Services with costs less than
supplemental funding may have believed they were obligating those "excess funds" for
necessary national defense needs, the GAO sees this practice as not matching funds to
their designated purpose. Because of this, the GAO now recommends that supplemental
funding to cover the cost of contingency operations should only be used for documented
expenses incurred in support of those operations. Also, if it is later found that a Service
receives funds in excess of actual documented costs, then the "excess" contingency funds
should be redistributed to other Services funding shortfalls before any additional
supplemental funds are appropriated by Congress (GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR Bosnia, p. 3).
The GAO study also conducted an analysis of the accuracy ofDoD cost
estimates. Close inspection revealed that these estimates seem to be little more than a
SWAG. The chart below shows some of the estimates associated with Bosnian
Operations and the percent that actual costs exceeded these estimates.













In summary, the GAO findings on DoD Supplemental Appropriation requests reveal the
following:
> Inaccurate DoD and Service cost estimates.
> Supplemental funds appropriated by Congress have not always gone to
replenish the Service accounts that were depleted by a contingency
operation.
> A strong concern by the GAO and Congress that any future
supplemental funding requests need to be based on accurate costs, and
that supplemental funds if appropriated need to get to the right accounts.
The tone of the GAO report seems to say: the DoD doesn't have its
accounting "act" together. Considering this, the Services can only do themselves a favor
by concentrating efforts on establishment of accounting systems that are capable of
identifying and documenting all costs (direct, indirect and administrative) associated with
contingency operations. This would derive two significant benefits. The first benefit is
that Congress would be able to develop greater trust and confidence in defense reporting.
This would make supplemental requests much more likely to be approved. The second
benefit of an accurate and timely reporting system would be that supplemental requests
could be made much sooner. More timely supplemental requests and a greater likelihood
of approvals would mean less disruption of operations, maintenance and training that must
now be delayed or cancelled.
Final Note on Bosnia: In the proposed budget for FY 1998, the President
proposed spending $2 billion to keep U.S. troops in Bosnia.: Where would these funds
come from? Administration officials told Congress that funds to pay for Bosnian
peacekeeping would be soughtfrom sources within the DoD (AP, 6 February 1997).
This means that even ongoing contingency operations are expected to be financed within
a steadily shrinking budget. In summary:
49
Under Current Financing Methods
The Services Have Only Three Choices:
(1) To learn to operate within available budget levels more efficiently.
(2) To perform contingency operations at the expense of current or future
readiness and capabilities.
(3) To accurately report the impact (both in dollars and in future
readiness) of conducting contingency operations so that DoD,
Administration and Congressional decision makers can make budgeting and
force use decisions based on the nation's long term best interests.
The first option basically means to continue doing what has been done in the past
but, a little better. In light ofthe strategic trends already discussed in Chapter II, doing
"it" 5% better than last year is not a formula for success. Declining defense budgets, the
changing concept of force use, and the dramatic increase in unanticipated and unbudgeted
missions are translating into a reduction in either current or future military readiness and
capabilities. The next section discusses the consequences of drawing from readiness as a
method to finance contingency operations.
C. FINANCING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS WITH
READINESS
This section taps into two research methodologies to analyze the direction of
military readiness. The first method is an archival study of post Cold War readiness
trends. The second method, involving informal interviews, was intended to serve as
confirmation ofthese trends. The results are surprising. This section discusses:
> Reported SORTS for the period of 1990-1995
> Problems associated with using SORTS as a readiness indicator
> Resource allocation decisions and the use of SORTS
> Lurking longer term problems
> Improving the accuracy of current readiness reporting systems
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1. Reported SORTS for the Period of 1990-1995. (gao/nsiad-96-i i ibr, pp. 9-16)
The primary method for military units to report the status of their combat readiness
is through the DoD Status ofResources and Training System (SORTS). If operational
units are accurately reporting this information up the chain of command, then at least the
short term problems associated with declining budgets and increasing contingency
commitments should be exposed in this readiness tracking system. Readiness trends
associated with contingency operations are discussed for each of the Services below.
a. Changes in Reported Navy Readiness Due to Contingency
Operations
Three of eight aviation squadrons in the study reported significant
reductions in readiness levels. Navy officials said these reductions were due to two
factors. (1) Contingency Operations caused a shortage of flying hour funding which
significantly reduced training readiness. (2) Personnel shortages caused by force structure
changes.
b. Changes in ReportedArmy Readiness Due to Contingency
Operations
Officials said that contingency operations generally affected readiness in
two ways. (1) As portions of units are deployed in response to a contingency operation,
the most mission capable aspects of those units (including equipment and supplies) are
normally sent along to carry out the operation. This leaves the remainder of the unit at a
lower overall readiness status. And (2), if a unit is engaged in a contingency operation, it is
unable to train in its full range of warfighting skills, or to maintain equipment in a mission
ready condition. This is the concept of opportunity costs discussed earlier.
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a Changes in Reported ZJSMC Readiness Due to Contingency
Operations
The percentage of units reporting C-l or C-2 declined. Officials said that
readiness for many units was not at desired levels Readiness reductions were due to
increased optempo demands (contingency operations) that required more detachments of
mission ready personnel to Marine Expeditionary Units, thus degrading the readiness
status of parent units. Shortages of personnel (budget and force structure reductions)
were also blamed for some units' decline in readiness.
d Changes in ReportedAir Force Readiness Due to Contingency
Operations
Continuous commitments affected readiness of airlift and specialty units.
Continuous use of aircraft to support contingency operations such as Desert Storm,
Somalia and Bosnia operations, along with counterdrug ops resulted in a "strain on the
supply of parts and engines and accelerated the rate at which aircraft required major
repairs" (GAO/NSIAD-96-1 1 lbr, pp. 14). Also reporting degrading readiness were
specialty units such as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) Squadrons.
These units are important to air space dominance operations and are normally one of the
first to deploy in a contingency operation.
2. Problems Associated With Accurate SORTS Reporting
Although the above research did show declines in readiness due to contingency
operations, further research reveals that military readiness levels may not even be as high
as reported.
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a, GAO Studies on Military Readiness Reporting
GAO studies assessing reported SORTS for this period reveal widespread
and unsubstantiated upgrade, "for extended periods of time," of units' overall readiness
status The General Accounting Office questioned this practice and the Services generally,
"could not determine in retrospect whether the upgrades were justified." The SORTS
system is made up of a subset of reporting categories involving manning levels, equipment
and supplies on hand, and training levels achieved. These subsets are based on objective
information such as number of crews formed, number of planes able to carry out missions,
and crew qualifications earned. According to the SORTS manual, the overall readiness
level reported should be the lowest C-Rating achieved by these subsets. But, (and herein
lies the problem) a unit commander has the authority to subjectively upgrade his unit's
overall reported readiness status (GAO/NSIAD-96-1 1 lbr, p. 3). Unfortunately, if these
same unit commanders feel that SORTS serves as a report card on their performance, they
also have an incentive to upgrade reported SORTS. SORTS reporting and incentives are
discussed in greater detail below.
b. Other Evidence Questioning the Accuracy of SORTS
A GAO report, titled Military Readiness: Improvements Still Needed in
Assessing Military Readiness
,
is the first source that implies that current reporting systems
may not accurately portray reality The findings of this report are summarized with the
following quote:
Formal readiness reports provided by SORTS have sometimes indicated a
higher state of readiness than appears warranted based on other
information comingfrom military personnel in the field. The implications
are that the formal reporting system is overly optimistic in its readiness
assessments, and questions can be legitimately raised about its credibility.
Source: GAO/NSIAD-97-107, Military Readiness. Improvements Still Needed in Assessing Military Readiness
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Another source questioning the accuracy of SORTS reporting is a study conducted
by Representative Floyd Spence's staff. In 1996, Representative Spence and his staff
conducted visits to over 50 military units. Based on these visits Representative Spence
states:
The reality is that years of declining defense budgets, a smaller force
structure, fewer personnel and aging equipment, coupled with an increase
in the number of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, are
stretching U.S. militaryforces to the breaking point.
Source: U.S. on the Verge of a Readiness Breakdown? Navy Times, April, 1997.
c. Interviews On the Accuracy ofReportedSORTS
To find out more about this subjective upgrade of reported SORTS,
informal and anonymous interviews were conducted to discuss actual vs reported
readiness levels, and the incentives that might influence inaccurate SORTS reporting.
Representatives from three different Services were interviewed. These individuals were
chosen for two reasons: (1) Their duties placed them directly involved with the SORTS
program of units they discussed. (2) Their experience was with front line units most likely
to be called upon during quick notice contingency operations. The results are provided
below.
Results of Informal Interviews Concerning Accuracy of SORTS Reporting
Interviews revealed that many of those who prepare SORTS reports, those who
work for reporting unit commanders, and unit commanders view SORTS as a "report
card" on performance. Because of this, there are strong incentives for those submitting
reporter to present their unit in the best light possible. As seen below, this incentive for
positive reporting (SORTS to please) was the overriding point expressed.
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> A Staff Training Officer stated that if a unit training officer reported C-3
just prior to deployment, then not only would the unit commander lose his
job, but the Wing Commander's job would also be put in jeopardy.
> A Squadron Readiness Officer knew that due to force structure
drawdowns, one of the five squadrons in his wing would be
decommissioned within the next six months. He also knew that the
squadron with the lowest, "mission capabilities as reported by SORTS"
would gain unwanted attention by those deciding which squadron would
go
> An aircraft carrier division officer stated that the commanding officer
wanted accurate SORTS data reported, but also stated that the carrier's
operations officer would upgrade the reported C-Status based on
"subjective" factors.
> An Army Company CO stated reporting Company C-Status based on
objective measures. The submitted report would be reviewed by the chain
ofcommand and released at a higher reported C-Status levels based on
"nonquantifiable" factors.
While the results of these informal interviews cannot be projected with
confidence to represent the attitudes and positions of entire Services, the survey does
support other evidence to the effect that incentives are at work that might induce many
unit commanders to report their units at levels not justified by training, equipment,
personnel or capabilities. This is especially troubling since CENC, DoD and Congressional
decision makers depend on accurate SORTS data to make planning and resource
allocation decisions.
3. Resource Allocation Decisions and the Use of SORTS
Readiness is the key indicator used by the Services and the Unified Commands to
determine if resources are available to effectively respond to crisis situations, i.e.,
contingency operations ( GAO/NSIAD-96- 1 lbr, p. 1). The DoD has stated that
maintaining a high degree of readiness is its first priority, (GAO/NSIAD-96- 1 1 lbr, p. 16)
and various systems are in place to identify and correct readiness concerns. But, a
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review ofthese systems shows that the key standard used to indicate a readiness problem
is the reported overall SORTS ratings. This means that unless incentives change, there
is a likelihood that the DoD will continue to use overstated readiness information for
resource allocation decisions.
a. The Solution is Education and Independent Auditing
Education: An understanding of the purpose of SORTS, up and down the
chain ofcommand is essential. From the division officer preparing inputs for executive
officer (XO) review, to the Unified Commander's off the record remarks; each has an
opportunity to influence the accuracy ofthe reporting system in ways that will either (a)
support the purpose ofthe SORTS system or (b) perpetuate unsubstantiated upgrades of
unit readiness. The DoD already offers classes on SORTS preparation. A halfday course
could be provided to prospective commanding/executive officers that emphasizes the
importance of accurate reporting and the fact that SORTS is not a "report card" on their
leadership abilities.
Independent Auditing: Although it would be convenient to think
education by itselfwould be the answer, it is probably necessary to use a system of
independent auditing similar to that used by companies to report financial statements to
shareholders. Figure 3.5 shows how this cycle might work.














Source: Internal Control & Auditing, Fremgen, 1996.
Figure 3.5 A Model for Improving the Accuracy of Reported Readiness
56
The proposed system in Figure 3.5 shows that Unit Commanders submit readiness
and capabilities information to auditors. Independent auditors take reported information
and forward it with their appraisal of the information's scope and fairness to outside
parties. Outside parties could be the CINCs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Congress, or others involved with resource allocation decisions. Then, based on a higher
confidence in reported information, resources could be allocated according to highest
priority national defense requirements.
1 n
An independent audit process is likely to provide two benefits.
> A reduction in incentives for reporting commanders to indiscriminately
increase reported readiness status.
> An increased confidence by resource allocators in the reliability of
reported SORTS.
b. Near Term Readiness Reporting Problems
As long as incentives remain for unsupportable and error prone upgrades
by unit commanders, any or all ofthe following are likely:
> The use of inflated SORTS data could serve as evidence that past
budget cuts have caused no real damage to the nation's military capabilities
or readiness. This could open the door for continued cutbacks.
> DoD efforts to correct readiness problems could suffer due to reliance
on inaccurate information.
> Units who report higher than actual readiness status could jeopardize
lives, missions and national interests.
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4. Longer Term Problems ?
As already shown, there is evidence that one source of financing contingency
operations is with current readiness. But, are we also borrowing from future military
capabilities to cover today's shortfalls? During the 1970s, military budgets emphasized
equipment purchases. The thought was, if a threat emerged, then force structure, training
and maintenance could be geared up and matched to already existing equipment. This
"hollow force" policy caused morale and readiness to suffer, and is not something today's
leaders (who were the junior officers ofthe 1970s) want to repeat.
In a telephone interview with the DoD Deputy Comptroller (O&M Accounts), the
process of dealing with reported unit readiness problems was discussed. The DoD takes
each case seriously and seeks to shift funds as necessary to "fix" reported problems.
Reprogramming requests are sent to Congress to "borrow" money from longer term
capital accounts in order to cover today's shortfalls. Meanwhile as already discussed
equipment is aging in two ways:
> Equipment procurement has been chopped by 10% in the last three
years. Acquisition programs are being stretched further into the future
This practice ends up costing money due to losses of economy of scale and
the inefficiencies of program stops and starts (WSJ, April 1, 1996).
> Operations like Bosnia, Rwanda, and seemingly annual surges to deter
aggressive moves by Iraq are causing already aging equipment to approach
end of design life even faster than anticipated.
As this aging equipment is not replaced, we might be setting ourselves up for
future problems that cannot be solved as easily as using today's technique of shifting funds
around. So, if the "hollow force" approach ofthe 1970s proved incorrect, and the
"maintain current readiness" approach of the 1990s has forced decision makers to borrow
from future capabilities, then what is an appropriate approach to defense resource
allocation. Chapter IV discusses a mission financing approach to resource allocation.
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This approach is capable of increasing adaptiveness to the changing strategic environment
and providing a better match between military capabilities and national security
requirements.
D. SUMMARY
1. A Review of the Contingency Operation Funding Cycle
When U.S. Armed Forces are directed to conduct a contingency operation, the
decision has already been made, whether explicitly or not, to forego the use of those
forces somewhere else. Ifthe operation involves primarily disaster relief or nation
building, then the forces are committed to a mission that is outside their primary
1 o
purpose. Not only are the forces involved in contingency operations unable to maintain
combat proficiency, but as funds are shifted to pay for the operation, nondeployed units,
who should be working up to deployment proficiency levels often find training accounts
drained and are thus also unable to carry out planned exercises intended to sharpen
warfighting skills. The result is a decline in either current or future military capabilities or
readiness. Below is a summary ofhow contingency operations are financed.
The Contingency Operation Financing Cycle
(1) The PPBS System allocates resources based on planned needs ofthe
Services to meet national security requirements.
(2) An unplanned and unbudgeted mission is assigned.
(3) The Services provide assets to accomplish the mission.
(4) The costs of the mission are initially paid with O&M funds from
current quarter apportionments. When those funds are exhausted, O&M
funds are "borrowed" against future quarters.
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(5) When O&M funds for the fiscal year are exhausted, funds are
reprogrammed from "lower priority" accounts. These reprograms include
maintenance and capital accounts, and transfers from sister Services not
even involved in the contingency.
(6) These actions cause Procurement and Construction activities to be
delayed, stretched and cancelled.
(7) As a contingency operation causes equipment (airplanes, ships, trucks,
etc.) to be used at a faster rate than originally anticipated, maintenance
requirements are accelerated and next generation replacements are needed
sooner.
(8) As life cycle estimates are shortened for capital equipment, funds are
also being funnelled away from the very multi-year appropriations that are
intended to fill these rapidly approaching future needs.
(9) Long-term readiness and military capabilities suffer.
2. Other Conclusions On Contingency Operations Financing
The Services do not have a firm grasp on the costs associated with contingency
operations. Direct costs such as fuel, Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) and special duty pay
are readily observable and much more likely to be accounted for. On the other hand,
indirect costs such as accelerated depreciation and the costs associated with increased
levels and periodicity of maintenance are less likely to be captured.
There will certainly be times when it is in the nation's vital interests to commit U.S.
forces to contingency operations not involving their primary role. But, when this does
happen, it is important to have an understanding of all the costs involved. An analysis of
these costs should include the opportunity costs of lost training, readiness and warfighting
potential.
Moving funds from inventory and capital goods accounts (e.g., OP, SCN, APN,
RDT&E) into expense accounts (e.g., MPERS and O&M) to pay for contingency
operations is just plain bad business. This practice could be compared to an individual
having funds allocated to a house or car payment, and using that money to pay for
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groceries and the electric bill. Neither the DoD nor that individual reveal sound fiscal
management, and both are jeopardizing the future just to get through another "pay" cycle.
Even with supplemental appropriations, some indirect and undocumented costs of
contingency operations are absorbed by the Services. This adds to the mismatch between
military capabilities, readiness, (either current or future) and ultimately the ability of the
Services to meet national security requirements. Executive Branch policy makers and
legislative branch flinders want and deserve DoD feedback systems that accurately portray
the costs in taxpayer dollars and military readiness of a potential or ongoing contingency
operation. Current systems are not doing this satisfactorily.
Throughout this chapter, suggestions have been made on how to improve existing
methods of recognizing and accounting for the costs associated with contingency
operations. But, continuing to do business as in the past, but a little better, is not the
solution. What is needed is a strategic shift in resource allocation methods capable of




Since the initial impact of contingency operations is on Operations and Maintenance
(O&M) accounts, the emphasis of this explanation is on how these requests for O&M
funding go through the PPBS System.
Not surprising since a 1517 violation requires a report of violation that includes
assignment of responsibility. The result of a violation could include administrative or
disciplinary action including: reduction in grade, suspension without pay, removal from
office, fines up to $5,000 and imprisonment for up to 2 years.
-j
J LCDR Larry Thompson, USN, Fiscal Officer, Marine Corps Air Station, Futenma,
Japan, interviewed by LCDR Joseph M. Flynn, at U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, February 16, 1994.
When operation Restore Hope began in December, 1992, (2 years after Desert Storm)
only 2 of 13 MPF shiploads had undergone required repairs and would not do so until
1994. As a result much ofthe equipment used by Marines in Restore Hope had not yet
received required maintenance.
For a closer look at the negative long-term effects of reprograms and transfers see
Appendix B.
The JTF was capable of providing resources where needed while maintaining the ability
to withdraw out of sight to a self sufficient bases located offshore.
n
Assistant Secretary ofthe Army memo, August 26, 1991.
o
Note: This was a full six months before the next fiscal year appropriations would be
available.
In a cover letter of the Omnibus Reprogramming Action from the Subcommittee on
National Security (House of Representatives), the Chairman states "I agree that additional
Bosnia costs necessitate reapplication of the O&M funds to the increased Bosnia costs."
Note: Recall that the Services were forced to submit this request for reprogramming
because the additional costs ofBosnia Operations were not forthcoming and it was
necessary to request relief from spending fences and floors from Congress, not because
the Services felt that the funds could be spared from "lower priority" items.
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Discussions with two different Navy Comptrollers on this point revealed that this was
not a startling conclusion. The focus of these reprograms was to meet the needs of today
in hopes that the funding shortfall in the longer term accounts could somehow be made up
in future year budgets.
See Appendix D for an example ofhow cutbacks and stretches add greatly to program
costs.
If the DoD or a Service is required to take the cost of some Congressionally mandated
item "out of hide," budget holders are often asked to take horizontal cuts to make up these
additional costs. This takes the appearance of a tax on an operational unit's budget and
undoubtedly restricts their capabilities.
J Overall Readiness status of a unit is reported by assigning "C" levels that are defined as
follows: C-l : Unit can undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized and
designed. C-2: Unit can undertake the bulk of its wartime mission. C-3: Unit can
undertake major portions of its wartime mission. C-4: Unit requires additional resources
and/or training to undertake its wartime mission, but if the situation dictates, it may be
required to undertake portions ofthe mission with resources on hand. C-5: Unit is
undergoing a service directed change and is not prepared to undertake its wartime
mission. (Navy SORTS Manual)
The individuals selected for these informal interviews do represent experience from
various types of units within the Services, but these volunteers were not selected based on
a statistical sample, and the experiences and opinions expressed should not be projected to
an entire Service.
15 January 23, 1997 Phone interview: The DoD Deputy Comptroller states: "One of the
Departments highest priorities is identifying and correcting readiness shortfalls."
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Including the Senior Readiness Oversight Council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Monthly Readiness Review, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It is essential that the auditors not only actually be independent of the audited
organization and its chain of command, but that they also appear to be independent in the
eyes of outside parties.




This thesis has described the circumstances of the Department ofDefense as
characterized by a dramatically changed strategic environment, declining defense budgets
and rising contingency requirements. Given these trends, it is clear that the DoD must
adopt a system of resource allocation able to meet the needs of this new environment. An
alternative system should provide incentives for efficient use of resources to meet the
needs of defense readiness, sustainability, force structure and modernization. The desired
system should also encourage a closer match between defense policy responsibilities and
budgetary authority. One system that meets these needs is mission financing. This chapter
introduces the mission financing concept, provides an examples ofhow it would work, and
outlines the advantages ofusing such a system. This will be presented as follows:
A. The Role of Combatant Commanders in Contingency Operations
Including:
> The Chain ofCommand of a Typical Contingency Operation
> The Responsibilities of Principle Players in a Contingency Operation
> The Mismatch between CINC Responsibilities and Authority
B. Mission Financing, Matching Budgeting Authority to Responsibilities
Including:
> Establishing a Working Definition of Contingency Operations
> The Proposed Flow of Funds for Mission Financing
> What is Required for Mission Financing to Work
> Advantages of a Mission Financing Approach
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A. THE CINCs 1 ROLE IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
A desirable system of resource allocation should encourage a close match between
defense policy responsibilities and budgetary authority. This section describes the
interrelationships between the Geographic CINCs and the Military Services in the
accomplishment of contingency responsibilities. The chain of command of a typical
contingency operation is presented, and the operational and fiscal responsibilities of
principle players are discussed. Concluding this section is a discussion of the mismatches
between responsibilities and budgeting authority inherent in the current system.
1. The Chain of Command of a Typical Contingency Operation




Note: Shading indicates operational
responsibility, dotted line indicates
fiscal responsibility.
Figure 4.1 CINCs Have Responsibility for Accomplishment of Contingency
Operations
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The chain of command relationships show that the Combatant Commander, or CINC, is
operationally responsible for an assigned contingency operation. The CINC accomplishes
assigned contingencies by using forces and assets provided by the service component
commands and supporting agencies.
2. Mismatch Between Responsibilities and Budgeting Authority
As Figure 4. 1 indicates, there is a mismatch between contingency operation
responsibilities and budgeting authority. The Services have budget authority to recruit,
train, equip and supply combat and support units (along functional lines) to the CINCs.
However, it is the CINCs who are responsible for mission accomplishment in specific












Antarctic Circle 92°W 30°W 17°E Antarctic Circle
Source: KPS, Basic Documents in National Security Volume I
Figure 4.2 CINCs Have Geographic Responsibilities But Little Budget Authority
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The CINCs are obligated to know the specific resource requirements and tailored
force needs of their area of responsibility (AOR). CINC responsibilities include
knowledge of a potential enemy's terrain, weather conditions, the types of forces required
for possible contingencies, and the types of logistical support needed for mission
accomplishment. Also part ofCINC responsibilities are the development of operation
plans, called Concept Summaries, for both major regional contingencies (MRCs) and
lesser regional contingencies (LRCs) anticipated to meet national security threats by
geographic region. What is needed is to match fiscal authority to the organizations
assigned to accomplish these responsibilities.
B. MATCHING BUDGETAUTHORITY TO MISSION
RESPONSIBILITY
This section establishes a working definition for contingency operations and
describes the proposed alternative flow ofbudgeted funds to finance these events. Also
discussed are the components of mission financing and the advantages of using such an
approach.
1. Establishing a Working Definition for Contingency Operations
One of the problems associated with effectively financing contingency operations is
in defining what constitutes such operations. Certainly Desert Storm would qualify, but
what about the operations leading up to Desert Storm (ie., Desert Shield). Would
extending the time on station of a battle group in response to Saddam's latest aggressive
moves qualify as a contingency operation?
Neither an archival search nor interviews with DoD officials produced answers as
to how the Pentagon actually defines contingency operations for the purposes of funds
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tracking. One method uses Joint Project Codes (JPCs) to identify operations that meet
certain criteria such as a high degree of visibility or costs that are expected to be
reimbursed by supplemental funding from Congress. However, other operations involving
significant incremental costs can go untracked.
It is proposed that all CINC-directed operations involving incremental costs to the
Services should be treated as contingency operations for funding purposes. A general
classification of these events is shown below.
Joint Heightened Force Forward OOTW LRC/ Conflict Termination
Exercises Readiness Surge Presence MRC Operations
Figure 4.3 Examples of Events Representing Incremental Costs to the Services
More specific examples of events that represent additional costs to the Services are
flexible deterrent options (FDOs). Military FDOs may be used in concert with diplomatic,
economic and political actions to respond to a developing crisis (AFSC PUB 1, pp. 6-8).
Figure 4.4 is a summary ofFDOs that should be tracked for financing purposes.
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EXAMPLES OF MILITARY FLEXIBLE
DETERRENT OPTIONS OPTIONS 1
• Employ readily In-place assets • Deploy Surface Action Group to the
• Upgrade alert status region
• Increase strategic reconnaissance
• Deploy CVBG to region
• Increase collection efforts
• Begin moving forces to air and sea ports
of embarkation
• Initiate or increase show of force actions
• Move Marine Expeditionary Brigade to
• Employ, electronic measures region
• Conduct aircraft flyovers • Deploy the forward-deployed ARG/MEU
to the region
• Increase exercise activities, schedules.
and scope • Activate procedures to begin reserve
callup
• Prestage or deploy contingency ready
brigades
• Increase military exchanges and staff
visits to the area
• Increase naval port calls or air squadron
visits to the area • Increase the use of SOF facilities
• specially designed teams
• Increase Mobile Training Teams
• Impose restrictions on military personnel.
• Prestage airlift
retirements, separations, and leaves: • Prestage airlift support assets
establish curfews
• Prestage sealift and airlift reception
• Institute provisions of existing host- ' assets to air end sea ports oi
nation agreements embarkation
• Open pre-positioned stockage facilities • Emplace logistics infrastructure where
• Use naval or air capability to enforce
possible
sanctions • Open and secure sea and air lines of
communication
• Deploy tactical fighter squadrons
• Increase informational efforts
• Order contingency forces to initiate
- PSYOP
actions to deploy
• measures directed at the military
• Deploy AWACS to region forces of the opponent
• Move MPS to region • mission awareness
Source: AFSC PUB 1, Figure 6-8.
Figure 4.4 Flexible Deterrent Options Are Specific Examples of CINC Directed
Events Involving Incremental Costs to the Services
It is proposed that if a CINC-directed operation is in the general or specific
categories of Figure 4.3 or 4.4, then the event should be identified as a contingency
operation for financing purposes. By defining and identifying a contingency operation as
exactly what it is, we can begin to build information and financial systems that more
accurately track actual response costs. As discussed, currently the Services routinely
absorb the costs of these operations until continuing to do so becomes either too costly or
significantly disrupts short-term capabilities. It would make more sense to track costs as
they occur and have them paid by the customer (the CINC). The Services would remain
responsible for funding their units' operating and maintenance requirements to meet basic
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and standardized levels of proficiency, and the requesting customers would finance all
incremental costs associated with directed operations.
This proposed arrangement is one that matches CINC responsibilities with
budgetary authority. The result is a system that provides incentives to the Services to
become more responsive and effective in meeting both CINC and national security needs.
The next subsection discusses one option to show how this system would work.
2. The Proposed Flow of Funds for Mission Financing
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Figure 4.5 The Flow of Funds for Mission Financing
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Figure 4.5 shows that units would receive budgeted funds from two sources. To
meet and maintain basic readiness standards, funding would flow through the Services. In
addition, funds for operations in support ofCINC requirements would flow from the
Unified Commands. Where would CINC-provided funds come from?
Figure 4.6 shows the current "Rubic's Cube" ofthe DoD Budget. Depicted are
Major Force Programs (MFPs), appropriation categories, and defense organizations that
currently have budgetary authority.
DoD BUDGET STRUCTURE
ORGANIZATIONS
OLA. OIA. JCS. OSO. «tc
MAJOR FORCE PROGRAMS
Note: CINCs Not Included as an Organization With Budgetary Authority
Source: AFSCPubl, 1991, pp. 5.
Figure 4.6 Current DoD Fiscal "Rubic's Cube"
Providing budgetary authority to match CINC responsibilities could be done by adding an
additional MFP for CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, and including the CINCs as





OLA. DIA. JCS. OSO. »lc
MAJOR FORCE PROGRAMS
Note: CINCs Have Budgetary Authority to Match Geographic Responsibilities
Figure 4.7 Revised DoD Fiscal "Ruble's Cube"
Money appropriated to the MFP "Contingency Operations" would include two
categories of funds. The first category would include anticipated incremental costs from
aACOM and other CENC-related joint training exercises Also included in the first
category would be funds for resources and forces allocated by the National Command
Authorities (NCA) for execution of contingency plans (User's Guide for Joint Operation
Planning, 1994, pp 4). The second category of funds would be: Investments for Future
Needs . This category would include CINC-directed RDT&E, Procurement and
Construction to meet the unique equipment or capability needs of specific geographic
regions (Jones and Bixler, 1992, Chap. 9; Thompson and Jones, 1994, Chap. 8).
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3. What is Required for Mission Financing to Work
Three essential components are required for this alternative system to work:
(1) A Customer (The CINC)
(2) A Supplier (The Services), and
(3) An Accounting System capable of accurately tracking and projecting costs.
The section below provides one example ofhow these components would work together.
Mission Financing in Practice
> A CINC identifies a need for certain mission capabilities in support of
national security requirements. This is part of a CENC's normal
responsibilities (called the joint operation planning process) and involves
the development of plans for potential crises involving military resources
that can reasonability be expected in a Combatant Commander's area of
responsibility (User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning, 1994, pp 4).
> Service Units, in the form of Adaptive Force Packages (AFPs), identify
potential costs, both direct and indirect, associated with providing the
identified mission capability.
> AFPs present mission capabilities and anticipated costs of providing
those services to the CINC staff. This would be done in much the same
way a free market manufacturer's representative markets goods and
services to buyers.
> The CINC evaluates offered services against similar services offered by
other AFPs. i.e., evaluates the costs and benefits of deploying a Carrier
Battle Group to meet forward presence requirements vs deploying a MEU
combined with land based aircraft, or other alternatives.
> The CINC offers to provide funding in return for a specific set of
mission capabilities.
> The Adaptive Force Package develops an Interservice Agreement (ISA).
The ISA represents a preliminary agreement between the CINC and the
Service Units, outlines the services to be provided, and sets up the
anticipated cost and control structure to perform the assigned mission, i.e.,
Cost/Flight Hour or Cost/Steaming Day.
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> The CINC reviews the ISA, works out modifications as desired, and
comes to agreement with the service providers on mission capabilities and
costs.
> The CINC tests capabilities and costs in planned exercises or in actual
operations where these mission capabilities are required.
The proposed mission accounting cycle of funds is shown below.
1. CINC (Customer) requests capabilities/resources from Services (Suppliers)
2. Services use working capital from Revolving Contingency Fund to finance
costs of providing capabilities/resources.
3. Capabilities/Resources are provided by Suppliers.
4. Accounting System Captures Costs and CINC (Customer) is billed
5. CINC reimburses Revolving Contingency Fund
Figure 4.8 Mission Financing Accounting Cycle
The advantage of having CINCs purchase capabilities from AFPs is that it provides
an incentive for all the Military Branches and Services to both compete and work together
to find complimentary resources. Adaptive Force Packages successful in "selling" their
services to a CINC are then funded to perform their assigned mission. Depending on the
needs of the CINC, the mission might range anywhere on a spectrum from maintaining
certain heightened levels of proficiency (i.e., readiness to surge forward on short notice) to
immediate action in a MRC As the AFP performs its duties, the CINC evaluates and
modifies its requirements to adapt to changing environmental and operational
requirements
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4. Advantages of a Mission Financing Approach
a. Providesfor More Efficient Resource Allocation
The Services' operational units that do the best job in meeting CINC
requirements are provided with incremental funding. Less capable or less efficient units
are not included in force packages, and thus do not obtain funding above levels required to
meet basic readiness standards. When the CINCs choose not to utilize and fund certain
operational units, the following outcomes are possible:
> The unit can offer capabilities to a different Geographic CINC. It is
possible that the mission capabilities required in one AOR may differ from
the requirements of another region.
> The unit can adapt itself better to the potential customer's needs, (i.e.,
CINC requirements) and reoffer the "new and improved" capabilities for
consideration.
> If a unit is consistently unable to provide the right mix of mission
capabilities at the right cost, then the Service of which that unit is a part
may decide to divert vital resources away from that unit and toward units
that show more promise in meeting CINC needs.
Each of these actions mirror what would happen in an efficient competitive market.
Organizations that provide products and services in demand are rewarded, while less
responsive organizations that produce goods no longer meeting customer needs face
declining market share and eventual elimination.
Another possible result of an operational unit's failure to meet CINC needs is that
it still may be in the nation's long-term national security interests to maintain that unit's
capabilities at established levels. An example of this might be the long-term need for
strategic deterrence. The CINCs would probably be more interested in allocating
resources to meet immediate regional concerns than in financing submarine, land, and
long-range bomber strategic weapon capabilities. In these situations, the JCS would make
recommendations to the OSD on the necessity for maintaining such capabilities.
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In summary, mission financing would provide incentives for operational and
support units to become more adaptive and cost effective. Financing would be two-tiered.
First, units would be budgeted to meet basic readiness standards from the Military
Departments and secondly, the CINCs would finance training and operations to meet their
regional needs. Finally, those units unwilling or unable to adapt to changing requirements
would tend to wither on the vine. The result would be a more efficient allocation of
defense resources.
b. Mission Financing and The Four "Pillars" ofDoD Resource
Allocation
Top level officials use the concept of the four "pillars" when considering
the soundness of a resource allocation policy. These four "pillars" can be thought of as
legs of a table. If one of the legs is weak, then the table is in jeopardy of collapsing. The
four pillars are described below.
The Four Pillars of Sound DoD Resource Allocation
1. Readiness and manpower issues address the availability and
competence of personnel to operate equipment and perform missions.
2. Sustainability refers to the availability of spare parts and other
essential support items which enables a unit to sustain operations in a
combat environment.
3. Force Structure relates to the quality and type of forces that would
result from funding certain programs.
4. Modernization issues involve the investment in new weapons and
equipment.
Mission financing provides incentives to stimulate the military to properly address each of
these "pillars". However, instead of allocation decisions made by centralized Pentagon
77
PPBS planners, as is currently the case, customer or CINC needs in support of national
security requirements are the drivers for resource allocation.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter defined the Combatant Commanders as responsible for the successful
accomplishment of contingency operations and made a case for considering an alternative
to the status quo to better match budgetary authority to CINC responsibilities.
Contingency operations were defined as CINC-directed events producing incremental
costs above those budgeted for normal operations. This is viewed as a first step in
establishing a cost accounting system to accurately track all costs associated with
contingency operations. With this accounting system in place, mission financing is
introduced as a method to improve the match between CINC responsibilities and budget
authority. This approach would produce a more efficient resource allocation system.
Finally, a model for the use of mission financing was presented and its inherent advantages
explained.
Given future budgetary constraints, the increasing likelihood of contingency
operations, and the dynamic state ofthe strategic environment, it is vitally important to
choose the best combination of resources and technology to meet future national security
objectives. It was argued that mission financing, supported by an accurate and timely cost
accounting system, would provide a better means for meeting these challenges than the




Interview with Susan Weeks, Defense Logistics Agency, DLA Integrated Data Bank
Administrator, 8 April, 1997.
2 ...An unexpected operational event which generates incremental costs above what was
budgeted to sustain readiness levels at established thresholds.
ACOM also has responsibility for joint training.
An Adaptive Force Package (AFP) is an operational unit or set of units (that may be
from different Services) that provides mission capabilities for a CINC. The AFP would
constantly change (adapt) to meet the needs of a changing environment in the CENC's
geographic region. AFP requirements, as developed by the CINCs, would be updated as
needed and these new needs would be available to other potential resource providers who
may be able to find a better or more efficient way of doing things. Since mission capability
providers are in competition with one another, this system provides incentives to
constantly improve, adapt, and make more efficient use of available resources.
By utilizing advances in Information Technology (IT), this could be done electronically
and in real time.
This type of arrangement obviously requires an effective information and cost
accounting system. Less than ten years ago this system would not have been plausible, but
both advances in microcomputer capabilities and the increased need (i.e., the change in the
strategic environment) make such a system both feasible and necessary.
7 An example of an Adaptive Force Package follows: In the Summer of 1993, a Navy P3
squadron initiated an exercise with a B52 squadron. This set of resources and capabilities
(or AFP) combined the advantages of the B52s' long legs and heavy lift capabilities with
the P3s targeting and communications abilities to create a low cost standoff weapon
delivery and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) system that was capable of rapid
response, continuous on-station presence, and real time two way Command and Control





A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to determine if current methods of financing
contingency operations are appropriate to meet the national security needs of the post
Cold War strategic environment. In order to reach a conclusion on this question, the
findings on the secondary research questions are summarized below.
1. How has the strategic environment changed since the end of the
Cold War, and what effect has this change had on the scope and
frequency of contingency operations?
Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic environment has changed in significant
ways and these changes are having a profound effect on the Pentagon's way of doing
business. Force structures can no longer be built around past threat assumptions.
Declining defense budgets are forcing a search for the most efficient use of dollars, and
contingency operations are on the rise for at least four reasons.
> Cold War era concerns about global conflict escalation and nuclear
retaliation no longer play as important a role in constraining commitment of
U.S. forces.
> As international humanitarian disasters and peacekeeping obligations
occur that outstrip the capabilities of every other organization or
government, the U.S. is increasingly turned to for leadership.
> Factors of disease, arms transfers and economic scarcity are increasingly
contributing to the political and economic breakdown of Third World
nation states around the world In an effort to support budding
democracies, U.S. forces are now more likely to be called upon to assist in
these situations.
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> The concept of force use has changed from the rigid guidelines ofthe
Weinberger Doctrine to a much more flexible concept. This change in
attitudes about force use makes today's strategic environment more fertile
ground for commitment of U.S. troops abroad.
These factors add up to an astonishing expansion in unplanned and unbudgeted
operations. This is documented in Figure 2.7 that shows the dramatic increase in U.S.
participation in UN operations, and in Appendix C where over the last five years nearly
100 unbudgeted contingency operations have accumulated significant but unidentifiable
costs.
2. How Have Recent Contingency Operations Been Financed?
The first method of financing contingency operations is by the loss of previously
planned and budgeted training and readiness opportunities. When U.S. Armed Forces are
directed to conduct a contingency operation, the decision has already been made, whether
explicitly or not, to forego the use ofthose forces somewhere else. Ifthe operation
involves disaster relief or nation building, then the forces are committed to a mission that
is outside their primary purpose. Not only are the forces involved in contingency
operations unable to maintain combat proficiency, but as funds are shifted to pay for the
operation, nondeployed units, who should be working up to deployment capable readiness
levels often find training accounts drained and are thus also unable to carry out planned
exercises intended to sharpen warfighting skills. The result is a decline in either current or
future military capabilities. Below is a summary of the contingency operation financing
cycle.
The Contingency Operation Financing Cycle
(1) The PPBS System allocates resources based on planned needs of the
Services to meet national security requirements.
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(2) An unplanned and unbudgeted mission is assigned.
(3) The Military Services provide assets to accomplish the mission.
(4) The costs of the mission are initially paid with O&M funds from
current quarter apportionments. When those funds are exhausted, O&M
funds are "borrowed" against future quarters.
(5) When O&M funds for the fiscal year are exhausted, funds are
reprogrammed from "lower priority" accounts. These reprograms include
maintenance and capital accounts, and transfers from sister Services not
even involved in the contingency.
(6) These actions cause procurement and construction activities to be
delayed, stretched and cancelled.
(7) As a contingency operation causes equipment (airplanes, ships, trucks,
etc.) to be used at a faster rate than originally anticipated, maintenance
requirements are accelerated and next generation replacements are needed
sooner.
(8) As life cycle estimates are shortened for capital equipment, funds are
also being funnelled away from the very multi-year appropriations that are
intended to fill these rapidly approaching future needs.
(9) Readiness and military capabilities suffer.
Other Conclusions On Contingency Operations Financing
The Military Services do not have a firm grasp on the costs associated with
contingency operations. Direct costs such as fuel, Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) and
special duty pay are readily observable and much more likely to be accounted for. On the
other hand, indirect costs such as accelerated depreciation and the costs associated with
increased levels and periodicity of maintenance are less likely to be captured.
There will certainly be times when it is in the nation's vital interests to commit U.S.
forces to contingency operations not involving their primary role. But, when this does
happen, it is important to have an understanding of all the costs involved. An analysis of
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these costs should include the opportunity costs of lost training, readiness and warfighting
potential.
Moving funds from inventory and capital goods accounts (e.g., OP, SCN, APN,
RDT&E) into expense accounts (e.g., MPERS and O&M) to pay for contingency
operations is simply bad business. This practice could be compared to an individual
having funds allocated to a house or car payment, and using that money to pay for
groceries and the electric bill. Neither the DoD nor that individual reveal sound fiscal
management, and both are jeopardizing the future just to get through another "pay" cycle.
Even with supplemental appropriations, some indirect and undocumented costs of
contingency operations are absorbed by the Services. This adds to the mismatch between
military capabilities, readiness, (either current or future) and ultimately the ability of the
Services to meet national security requirements. Executive Branch policy makers and
legislative branch flinders want and deserve DoD feedback systems that accurately portray
the costs in taxpayer dollars and military readiness of a potential or ongoing contingency
operation. Current systems are not doing this satisfactorily.
3. Is there an alternative and more effective approach for financing
contingency operations to meet the needs of the new strategic
environment?
Chapter IV defined the Combatant Commanders as responsible for the successful
accomplishment of contingency operations and made a case for considering an alternative
to the status quo to better match budgetary authority to CINC responsibilities.
Contingency operations were defined as CENC-directed events producing
incremental costs above those budgeted for normal operations. This is viewed as a first
step in establishing a cost accounting system to accurately track all costs associated with
contingency operations. With this accounting system in place, mission financing is
introduced as a method to improve the match between CINC responsibilities and budget
authority. This approach would produce a more efficient resource allocation system.
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Finally, a model for the use of mission financing was presented and its inherent advantages
explained.
In conclusion, given future budgetary constraints, the increasing likelihood of
contingency operations, and the dynamic state of the strategic environment, it is vitally
important to choose the best combination of resources and technology to meet future
national security objectives. It was argued that mission financing, supported by an
accurate and timely cost accounting system, would provide a better means for meeting
these challenges than the status quo system of planning, programming and budgeting
employed by the Department of Defense.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The scope of this thesis was limited primarily to an analysis of the environment, a
study ofhow we are currently doing business in this environment, and a strategy for
financing contingency operations in a way that will more efficiently match resources with
national security needs. To build momentum for meaningful change in the proper
allocation of resources for contingency operations, it is hoped that further research can be
conducted in the following areas:
> The development of a reliable system for evaluating and reporting
readiness (possibly based on output measures of effectiveness vs
the currently used input measures).
> The status of the military's progress toward a common accounting
and database system.
> The development of cost accounting and reporting standards for
accelerated depreciation of capital equipment involved in
contingency operations.
> How DoD financial management initiatives match with
operational initiatives such as Joint Vision 2010.
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> The role that advancing technology has on the speed and accessibility of
cost information for decision making.
> How to convert a viable strategy (mission financing) into reality
This thesis has attempted to explain mission financing in a way that
was sufficiently clear to make the strategy operational. But, more
efforts are needed to break down this strategy into substrategies
and action plans. Also, the mechanics of reworking budgets,
changing policies and modifying procedures remains. This is an
area of research rich with opportunity and potential rewards.
Further analysis of the strategic environment also is encouraged. The strategic
environment is dynamic, complex, uncertain and rich in detail. By periodically and
critically reassessing the validity of assumptions about the environment, we are more
likely to develop sound financial strategies that meet the national security needs for today




ALLOCATION~The first subdivision of an apportionment. An authorization by a
designated official of a component of the Department of Defense making funds available
within a prescribed amount to an operating agency for the purpose of making allotments
ALLOTMENT~The authority to obligate and expend funds for a particular purpose.
Used for all appropriations except the accounts that use operating budgets.
APPORTIONMENT—A determination made by the OMB which limits the amount of
obligations or expenditures which may be incurred during a specified time period, for a
specific activity, function or project.
APPROPRIATION—Provides a specific amount of funds to be used for designated
purposes.
AUTHORIZATION—Congressional legislation that is normally a prerequisite for
subsequent appropriations, but does not provide budget authority.
COCOM~The authority of a combatant commander to perform the functions ofcommand
over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning
tasks, designing objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military
operations, joint training and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to
the command.
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OPCON—Includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint
training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.
TACON—Local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to
accomplish assigned missions or tasks.
OUTLAY—An actual cash payment.
REPROGRAMMING~The transfer of funds between programs of an appropriation; a
shifting of funds from the original purpose for which they were justified by Congress.
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION-An appropriation enacted as an addition to a
regular annual appropriation act. Supplemental appropriations provide additional budget
authority beyond original estimates for programs or activities.
TRANSFER AUTHORITY-The authority provided by Congress to move budget
authority from one appropriation to another.
Sources: Naval Postgraduate School Handbook for Practical Comptrollership. March 1996.
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APPENDIX B
THE EFFECTS OF REPROGRAMS AND TRANSFERS
During research of financing sources for contingency operations, the term "lower
priority items" was seen often but is something of a question. The evidence shows that
when a contingency operation is assigned to a CINC, it automatically becomes of highest
priority. If funds are expended in accomplishment of this mission and no additional funds
are provided to reimburse the Services for this expenditure, then any funds not already
obligated become "lower priority." The point is, the words "lower priority" seem to carry
the same meaning as "not necessary" while what it really means is "not yet obligated and
thus available to pay for the unexpected but already expended costs of an assigned
mission." Also, these "lower priority" accounts used to finance contingency operations do
have a significant effect on combat readiness and capabilities. The effect of diverting
funds from these "lower priority" accounts could be either short term and direct such as
loss of steaming, flying or training opportunities, or the effect could be long-term and
indirect such as delays in maintenance, reductions in "quality of life" or increased
optempos. Whether near-term or long-term, these costs must be absorbed somewhere. It
is up to the Services to document and present this information to DoD, Executive and
Legislative decision makers. One ofthese "lower priority" accounts where funds have
been transferred from is Maintenance of Real Property (MRP). Figure Bl shows the
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Navy-Wide Backlog ofMaintenance and Repair (BMAR) Is Large and Growing While
Maintenance ofReal Property Remains Below Cost of Ownership
Source: Practical Comptrollership, 1996, p. M-6
Figure B.l Navy BMAR vs MRP Funding
As can be seen above, the gap between requirements and funding started in FY
1987. But, because of the long-term of execution for many construction and maintenance
contracts, the effects on mission support capabilities may now just be starting to show.
Note that 1987 also marks the beginning ofthe strategic shift away from a bipolar world
and into the period of increasing requirements for contingency operations to support
national security requirements.
The BMAR (Backlog ofMaintenance and Repair) is an indicator of the estimated
dollar deficiencies of base facilities. This is determined in an annual inspection known as
the Annual Inspection Summary (AIS). The AIS compares material condition of facilities
against minimum standards for the assigned mission. This "lower priority" account shows
a large and growing backlog of maintenance requirements. Also shown is MRP Funding
lower than actual cost of ownership. This "cost of ownership" is based on an
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unreasonable assumption of zero inflation and thus is already understated The result is a
visible deterioration of facilities due to lack of maintenance dollars and an inevitable
decline in future combat capabilities of operational units which these facilities support.
The business manager of a major PWC commented that the Navy's facility
condition is a result of nearly a decade of decline wherein buildings have not been painted,
roofs were not repaired and grounds not maintained. Referring to a major Navy facility's
physical condition, he said: "Take a look around, [unless methods or priorities change]
this is the best you'll ever see it" (Practical Comptrollership, 1996, pp. M-7). If current
financing methods continue, the increased likelihood of contingency operations will likely
contribute to this bad situation. Some decisions that look good in the short term can have
disastrous long term consequences. Deferring maintenance to pay for today's unbudgeted
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ADDS GREATLY TO COSTS
Design-to-Cost assumptions, previously based on original production quantities
and rates prove incorrect and cause costs per unit to rise. Below is an example ofhow
stretches have caused costs for the Seawolf Submarine program to spiral from $1.5
billion/unit to $5.2 billion/unit.
Costs Rise as Programs are Stretched
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